

the United States. They have earned a reputation as highly respected businessmen, ministers and politicians. Such distinguished men as American statesman Benjamin Franklin, Composer Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, French philosopher Voltaire and U.S. President George Washington have all been Brothers in the Masonic order.

My own association as a Brother with my fellow Masons has been a great influence on me throughout my career and in public life. Their moral values and ethical code have been an immeasurable help to guide me in making fair and just decisions in my responsibilities as a Member of this chamber.

Mr. Speaker, hopefully the Athelstane Lodge will continue its good works as a model organization and will continue to help those in need as well as continue to be an exemplary example of fraternal service to our communities for another 100 years.

TRIBUTE TO CAPTAIN DARRYL A.  
KELLY

HON. JAMES E. CLYBURN

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 21, 2002

Mr. CLYBURN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to Captain Darryl A. Kelly of Society Hill, South Carolina, whose dedication to his duties as a national guardsman earned him the honor of being the first African American from South Carolina to receive the General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award.

A Society Hill native, Captain Kelly received a Bachelor of Arts in Business Administration from Coker College and a Master's degree in Public Administration from Troy State University. He joined the National Guard in 1989, after seven years active duty in the Army, and commands Company "A", 151st Signal Battalion in Laurens, South Carolina. Captain Kelly is also a South Carolina Highway Patrol sergeant with thirteen years experience.

Captain Kelly will receive the General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award on May 22, 2002, a distinction bestowed upon only seven Army National Guardsmen in the nation each year. He automatically qualified last month when he won the General James C. Dozier award, which recognizes the South Carolina National Guard's most outstanding company officer for leadership and quality of service. Captain Kelly is not only the first African American from South Carolina to receive the MacArthur Leadership award, but only the second South Carolinian to have this honor bestowed upon him.

Mr. Speaker, I ask that you and my colleagues join me in honoring Captain Darryl A. Kelly, a dedicated guardsman whose service and leadership should be commended. I congratulate him on his receipt of the General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award and wish him good luck and Godspeed in his future endeavors.

IN RECOGNITION OF MICHAEL  
LAHEY

HON. JAMES P. MCGOVERN

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 21, 2002

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize IRS Special Agent in Charge of Criminal Investigation, Michael Lahey, for his promotion to Director of the Review and Program Evaluation Section at IRS Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Lahey began his career with the Internal Revenue Service in 1982 as a Special Agent in Miami, Florida. Through his dedication and hard work, Mr. Lahey was selected as the Branch Chief in Boston in 1997. He held that position until his selection as Special Agent in Charge for the Boston Field office in 2000.

As Special Agent in Charge for New England, his team of 140 IRS employees followed the money trail through a wide range of financial investigations. His team has examined cases involving tax evasion, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, public corruption, as well as healthcare and insurance fraud. As a direct result of asset forfeitures from IRS drug trafficking and organized crime cases, the people of Massachusetts have benefited greatly from the substantial sums that have been reinvested in state and local police departments during his tenure in the Boston office.

Mr. Lahey, a resident of Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, has been a strong supporter of sports programs for youngsters in his community. He has served as the Director of Minor League Baseball for the Little League and has coached for several years.

Mr. Speaker, I ask that you join me in congratulating Michael Lahey for his outstanding service with the Internal Revenue Service. I wish him the best of luck in his new position.

BOB STUMP NATIONAL DEFENSE  
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL  
YEAR 2003

SPEECH OF

HON. PETER A. DeFAZIO

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 16, 2002

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4546) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for military activities of the Department of Defense, and for military construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 2003, and for other purposes;

Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to continue my remarks about H.R. 4546, the fiscal year 2003 Department of Defense authorization act. In my previous remarks, I criticized the House Rules Committee for blocking all amendments, including five I drafted, that would have allowed the House to debate the wisdom of various weapons systems. I also detailed the rationale for my amendments to eliminate the Crusader artillery system.

In my remarks today, I want to discuss another weapons system—the Army's Comanche helicopter—that is behind schedule, over

budget, and unable to meet critical performance requirements.

In at least eight reports since 1986, the GAO has raised concerns about the Army's effort to develop its next generation light helicopter, now known as the Comanche.

Further, the Army itself has recognized problems with the Comanche program, which has been restructured five times since its inception. Previous restructurings have significantly delayed the development schedule, extended the production schedule, and reduced planned quantities.

I personally have been raising red flags about the Comanche program since the late 1990s. The first GAO report I requested on the Comanche was released in August 1999. This report identified a number of cost, quality control, and performance concerns about the Comanche program.

An updated report I requested from the GAO was released in June 2001. This report concluded that the concerns raised in the August 1999 report had only gotten worse.

It is not just the GAO that has raised concerns. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has also been critical of the Comanche.

I was pleased to see the House Armed Services Committee imposed a few conditions on the Army's Comanche helicopter program in H.R. 4546.

One of the conditions, a requirement that the Army reassess the cost and timeline of the Comanche program, is similar to what I proposed in an amendment last year.

The other condition, an annual report by the DOD Inspector General, is a useful step in providing for constant, independent oversight of the program.

However, I am concerned that the Committee did not go quite far enough in protecting taxpayers from runaway costs for a program GAO and others have consistently identified as failing to meet testing and performance goals.

The amendment I offered would have prohibited the Pentagon from awarding contracts for low rate initial production (LRIP) until the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, certified that the testing program has been rigorous enough to determine the program performs as expected in an operational environment, in other words, not just in computer simulation or laboratory tests. The amendment also required that the Comanche achieve key performance standards before contracts for LRIP could be awarded.

According to the June 2001 GAO report, a decision on whether to move forward with low rate initial production was expected in June 2005.

It is my understanding that in the year since the GAO report, the Comanche program has fallen even further behind schedule, and a LRIP decision now may not occur until 2008.

Some might argue that my amendment, therefore, was premature. I would argue that given the repeated mismanagement of the Comanche program, Congress must send the unmistakable message that the program will not advance toward production until timing, cost, quality, and performance concerns are all addressed to our satisfaction. My amendment would have sent that message.

Defense contractors push hard to get to LRIP decisions because, once they are over

that hump, they know it is nearly impossible to kill the program. That is why Congress needed to signal now that we have no intention of allowing the LRIP decision from being made until we are fully satisfied the Comanche will work as advertised and will be built within reasonable cost and time constraints.

I'd like to run down a few of the specific problems with the Comanche.

In August 1999, the GAO warned the Comanche faced significant risks of cost overruns, scheduling delays, and degraded performance primarily because the Army decided to (1) begin engineering and manufacturing development before key technologies had matured, (2) compress the flight-testing schedule, which increases concurrency between development and operational testing, and (3) begin initial production before completing operational testing.

In its most recent report, issued in June 2001, the GAO noted the problems identified in the August 1999 report have gotten worse. The GAO cites a range of concerns including understated acquisition program cost estimates; ambitious flight test schedules with substantial concurrency in test events; delays in another DOD program, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which had been counted on to develop a critical component of the aircraft; inadequate facilities to fully test and integrate system hardware and software; and considerable growth in aircraft weight.

The program's total development and production cost estimate has increased by almost \$4.8 billion—from \$43.3 billion to \$48.1 billion. This includes a \$75 million increase in development costs and a nearly \$4.8 billion increase in production costs. As the GAO notes, these costs are likely to further escalate.

DOD's most recent cost estimate for the Comanche was done in April 2000. At that time, DOD's Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimated the Comanche would need an additional \$180 million for its engineering and manufacturing development phase. However, this money was not included in the April 2000 baseline.

Further, in January 2001, DOD added about \$504 million in funding to the Comanche program over the next few years. About \$84 million was earmarked for RDT&E, the remaining \$420 million was for production. These additional funds have not yet been reflected in the program's official cost estimates.

The Comanche program office also maintains a list of unfunded requirements that total \$68 million. According to the GAO, "The program office acknowledges that, unless additional funds are obtained, some yet-to-be-determined program performance requirements could be impacted."

The Comanche is also missing testing and production targets.

The GAO is particularly critical of the Comanche development and testing schedule, in which many crucial events come close together and concurrently in the late stages. The GAO specifically writes, "We have reported that when development work and low-rate initial production (LRIP) are done concurrently, significant schedule delays that cause cost increases and other problems are not uncommon in early production. Also, production processes are often not able to consistently yield output of high quality when full-rate production begins."

Before entering the LRIP stage, previous GAO work has shown successful commercial

firms already know that (1) technologies match customer requirements; that is, they can fit onto a product and function as expected, (2) the product's design meets performance requirements, and (3) the product can be produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets. According to GAO, "It is unlikely the Army will have this level of knowledge about Comanche" by the June 2005 LRIP decision date.

Specifically, the GAO notes "several critical subsystems—to be included in the mission equipment package—may not be available until development flight-testing is well underway. These subsystems are very complex state-of-the-art systems that have not been demonstrated on a helicopter platform like Comanche." The GAO goes on to warn "the Army's schedule for developing and testing software for the Comanche may not be completed prior to the full-rate production decision."

Failure to correct deficiencies prior to LRIP could lead to costly retrofits and repairs to aircraft already produced. As GAO wrote "To produce that many aircraft during low-rate initial production, the Army will have to ramp up its production capabilities rapidly and at a time when the aircraft design is still evolving as new subsystems are introduced and test results are evaluated."

The Comanche is also failing to meet performance requirements.

GAO says the Comanche is at risk of not achieving its rate of vertical climb requirement. The Comanche's ability to climb at a rate of 500 feet per minute is a key performance requirement as identified by the DOD itself. The Comanche's weight was a concern in the GAO's August 1999 report. The problem had only gotten worse by the time of the June 2001 report. The Comanche's empty weight had increased by 653 pounds—from 8,822 to 9,475—which threatens the vertical climb requirement.

GAO also says the Comanche is unlikely to complete the development and integration of its mission equipment package, which is needed to support a range of important functions including early warning, target acquisition, piloting, navigation, and communications.

GAO also warns the program is not successfully completing development of the system for detecting equipment problems. A critical component of the Comanche is its on-board fault detection system that can rapidly and accurately provide information about equipment problems. Without this system, the cost of maintaining the aircraft would increase. According to the Army, this system needs to be 75 to 95 percent accurate—75 percent for mechanical and electrical equipment and 95 percent for avionics and electronics equipment. However, the Comanche program office has concluded this requirement will be difficult to achieve within the current cost, weight, and packaging constraints and does not expect to achieve a mature fault detection and fault isolation capability until two years after initial fielding.

Finally, the GAO warns the Comanche is failing to achieve the "beyond-line-of-sight" communications capability needed to perform its mission. Satellite communications are essential to this reconnaissance capability. The Army was planning to rely on satellite communication technology that was being developed and miniaturized as part of the Joint Strike

Fighter program. However, the JSF has been delayed. The Comanche program office now believes it must develop its own satellite communication technology. GAO warns the development schedule "remains high-risk for the timely inclusion of this capability on the initially fielded Comanche helicopters."

Finally, the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation raised significant concerns about the Comanche in a 2000 report. Among the criticisms, the report said:

"It is highly unlikely that the Service can deliver the expected system performance within the current budget and schedule. Lacking an operational assessment of an integrated system, it is difficult to predict with any degree of confidence whether the individual subsystems can be successfully integrated, whether the subsystems will function properly in an operational environment, or whether, in concert, they will provide the anticipated benefits in operational performance."

"DOT&E's assessment of the Comanche's weight projections found several questionable areas, including overly optimistic expected weight reductions and questionable estimates of future weight growth."

"Overall, the Comanche has a risky test and evaluation strategy for integrating the MEP (mission equipment package) on the aircraft ... The resulting schedule compression allows little reserve in the timetable, thereby increasing the impact of unforeseen events/delays."

As the aforementioned warnings I've outlined from the GAO and the Pentagon's own Director of Operational Test and Evaluation make clear, Congress should not continue to pour money into the Comanche without regard to results.

Unfortunately, H.R. 4546 continues to sink billions of taxpayer dollars into weapons system of dubious utility and questionable performance.

## RECOGNIZING OLDER AMERICANS MONTH IN MAY

**HON. RON KIND**

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, May 21, 2002*

Mr. KIND. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in recognition of Older Americans Month, May 2002. The theme this year is America: A Community for All Ages, recognizing the national community in which we live, and paying tribute to the multi-generational family that is the strength of America.

Older members of our families and communities provide us with a historical perspective and contribute to our nation's greatness and prosperity. The experiences, stories, and knowledge of our senior citizens are integral to our understanding of our country and our world. To help preserve their stories I am proud to have authored legislation during the 106th Congress that created the Veterans History Project. The Veterans History Project is run by the Library of Congress, which coordinates a collection of video and audio recordings of the personal histories of American war veterans, as well as copies of their letters, diaries, and photographs. The library will also establish a publicly accessible archive for these recordings and documents.

Beyond this project, I have always strongly advocated for legislation that supports our Nation's seniors. Two of the most important